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Iran’s limited options for retaliation amid calls to end counterattacks


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While the Islamic Republic’s establishment downplays Israel’s air strikes as ineffective and praises Iran’s air defenses, many hardliners are pushing for a retaliatory response—one that risks triggering further reciprocal attacks.


Details of the Israeli attack are still unclear. The only certainty is that the air strikes targeted air defense systems and missile production facilities, but exactly how many targets were hit and what the damage was, has not yet been disclosed.


What are Iran's options for retaliation, despite its earlier stance suggesting it might forgo a response to a limited Israeli attack to avoid prolonging the cycle of counterattacks? Iran has already launched hundreds of ballistic missiles at Israel twice this year, causing minimal damage. With no effective air force, Iran’s retaliatory capabilities are largely confined to a few types of medium-range ballistic missiles, whose accuracy remains uncertain.

Both Israel and the United States have warned Tehran not to respond to this attack. “We urge Iran to cease its attacks on Israel so that this cycle of fighting can end without further escalation,” US National Security Council spokesman Sean Savett told reporters. The US has boosted its forces in the region with the aim of deterring further Iranian attacks, especially against its Arab allies around the Persian Gulf.


Iran has around 3,000 missiles available for more attacks against Israel, but it is not so much an issue of weapons availability, as much as an issue of more Israeli counterstrikes, while Iran’s skies apparently remain defenseless. There are no reports of Iranian air defenses intercepting even one Israeli missile on October 26. There are also no reports of any fighter jets being scrambled to face Israeli planes, which probably fired their ordinance from Iraqi airspace.


This means that if Iran decides to launch another round of missiles, Israel could counterstrike by targeting assets that would significantly impact Iran's Islamic government—particularly its economic infrastructure. One major point of weakness is oil refineries that produce for the domestic market. Iran has two large refineries and even if one of them is damaged, the country would face serious problems at the onset of winter. This approach would avoid impacting global oil prices, allowing Israel to sidestep potential backlash from the US, which has advised against targeting Iran's oil production and export facilities.


In recent past, Iran’s rulers could count on their well-armed proxies, such as the Lebanese Hezbollah, to play the role of a deterrent against Israel. However, after Israeli operations that became intense in recent months, both Hezbollah and Hamas have been significantly weakened. Despite Israel’s relentless bombardment of targets in Lebanon, Hezbollah has not been able to launch tens of thousands of rockets that many feared could overwhelm air defenses.


As a result, Iran’s longstanding strategy of confronting Israel through proxies abroad appears to have faltered, with hostilities now reaching its own soil. A single major Israeli airstrike on critical economic targets could pose serious threats to the Islamic government, already grappling with multiple economic crises. An impoverished population—hard-hit over the past five years and shown to be ready to protest—may not tolerate another severe decline in living conditions.


Iran's missile arsenal is the largest and most diverse in the Middle East. In 2022, U.S. Central Command's General Kenneth McKenzie stated that Iran possesses “over 3,000” ballistic missiles. This does not include the country’s burgeoning land-attack cruise missile force.[1] Iran has made substantial improvements over the past decade in the precision and accuracy of its missiles, which make them an increasingly potent conventional threat.[2] The focus on precision and accuracy has been accompanied by a self-imposed missile-range limit of 2,000 km, first publicly acknowledged in 2015. Iran could, however, abandon the limit at any time, and indeed has deployed a system, the Khorramshahr, that could almost certainly reach longer ranges if equipped with a lighter warhead. Finally, despite an early reliance on liquid-fueled missiles, Iran has since placed a greater emphasis on developing solid-propellant missiles. This trend will likely continue.[3]


Many Iranian missiles are inherently capable of carrying nuclear payloads, which has long been an international concern. For example, U.N. Security Council resolution 2231 contained language calling upon Iran “not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons,” for a period of eight years. That exhortation, along with U.N. restrictions on Iranian procurement of missile technology and targeted sanctions on entities involved in missile development, expired in October 2023. But even when the restrictions were in place, Iran persisted in developing a wide array of missiles that are inherently capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, as well as space launch vehicles (SLVs) that use many of the same technologies as longer-range ballistic missiles.

Iran has employed missiles in combat on multiple occasions since 2017, including a ballistic missile attack on Iraqi bases hosting U.S. forces in 2020. Iran has also transferred missiles to proxies such as Yemen’s Houthi rebels, who have used them to strike civilian targets in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and, more recently, to harass commercial ships transiting the Red Sea. It has also allegedly considered selling them to Russia. 


The table below sets forth what is publicly known, claimed, or estimated about the capabilities of Iran's missiles that are most likely to be used either as nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles or for conventional strikes against high-payoff targets, such as bases or infrastructure.[4] Clicking the name of a missile in the table will open an image of that missile in a new tab.

Name

Type[5]

Max Range

Payload

Propulsion

CEP[6]

Status

Shahab-1 (Scud B)

SRBM

up to 300 km

770-1,000 kg

liquid fuel, single stage

~500 m

deployed

Shahab-2 (Scud C)

SRBM

~500 km

~700 kg

liquid fuel, single stage

 700 m

deployed

SRBM

700-800 km

650 kg

liquid fuel, single stage

<500 m[7]

deployed

Fateh-110 (including Khalij Fars and Hormuz[9])

SRBM

300 km

~450 kg

solid fuel, single stage

100 m[10]

deployed

SRBM

500 km

350 kg

solid fuel, single stage

10-30 m[11

deployed

SRBM

500 km

unknown

solid fuel, single stage

30 m

tested

SRBM

700 km

450-600 kg

solid fuel, single stage

10-30 m[13

deployed

SRBM

1,000 km

450-600 kg

solid fuel, single stage

10-30 m[14

deployed

MRBM

1,300 km

750-1,000 kg

liquid fuel, single stage

~3 km

deployed

MRBM

1,600 km

~750 kg

liquid fuel, single stage

300 m

deployed

MRBM

1,800 km

~750 kg

liquid fuel, single stage

<500 m

deployed

Khorramshahr-1, -2, and -4 (BM-25/Musudan)

MRBM[15]

2,000-3,000 km

750-1,500 kg

liquid fuel, single stage

30 m

deployed

MRBM

1,400 km

unknown

solid fuel, single stage[17]

unknown

tested

MRBM

1,400 km

500 kg

solid fuel, single stage

unknown

deployed

MRBM

1,450 km

450-600 kg

solid fuel, single stage

unknown

deployed

MRBM

2,000 km

~750 kg

solid fuel, two stage

unknown

deployed

Soumar (Kh-55)

LACM

unknown[18]

unknown

turbofan engine

N/A

possibly deployed

LACM

1,350 km

unknown

turbojet engine

N/A

possibly deployed

LACM

700 km

unknown

turbojet engine

N/A

tested

LACM

1,650 km

unknown

turbojet engine[20]

N/A

deployed

SLV

2,100 km[21]

500-750 kg[21]

liquid fuel, two stage

N/A

retired

SLV

4,000-6,000 km[21]

500-750 kg[21]

liquid fuel, two stage

N/A

operational

SLV

2,200 km[21]

1,000 kg[21]

liquid 1st stage; solid 2nd and 3rd stages

N/A

operational

SLV

4,000-5,000 km[21]

1,000 kg[21]

solid 1st and 2nd stages, liquid 3rd stage

N/A

tested

SLV

3,000-4,000 km[21]

1,000 kg[21]

solid fuel, three stage

N/A

operational


 
 
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